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Abstract: Although Deleuze’s work on Spinoza is widely known, it 
remains poorly understood. In particular, Deleuze’s interpretation of 
Spinoza’s immanentism has not been treated sufficient care; that is, with 
an eye to the context of its elaboration and the way in which it gradually 
takes on different characteristics. With this paper, I offer a synoptic 
analysis of Deleuze’s views on immanence in Spinoza and examine 
how these change over the course of Deleuze’s career. There are three 
ascending stages here: a first one, where Deleuze’s attention is drawn 
to more recognizable issues in understanding Spinoza’s views on the 
deep metaphysical structure of reality; a second, more experimental 
one, where Deleuze questions what it means to be a reader of Spinoza in 
light of Spinoza’s theory of the body and affects; and a third, particularly 
iconoclastic stage, where Deleuze develops the theory of “the plane of 
immanence” as a way of articulating a meta-philosophical story about 
the place of non-philosophy at the heart of all philosophy. I trace each of 
these accounts, tie them together to tell a coherent and comprehensive 
narrative, and show what may be learned from this Spinoza that Deleuze 
portrays as drunk on immanence.
Keywords: Deleuze; Spinoza; immanence; affects; meta-philosophy; 
non-philosophy.
Introduction
The poet Novalis’ well-known evocation of Spinoza as “ein Gott-trunkener 
Mensch” is said to capture a noteworthy aspect of philosophical 
interpretations of Spinoza during the post-Kantian era of German 
philosophy.1 What I would like to offer here is a detailed analysis of 
Spinoza as un homme ivre d’immanence — that is, Gilles Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Spinoza. Recent Spinoza literature often engages with 
Spinoza’s immanentism, especially but not exclusively in the European 
context,2 while Deleuze’s relation to Spinoza continues to receive 
1 A point emphasized as early as 1893 by Delbos (1893), 317-330. Novalis’ quote is from his Encyclo-
pedia (Novalis 1802, vol. 1, p. 338). Novalis’ talk of Spinoza as “a man drunk on God” foreshadows 
in a pre-philosophical mode the interpretation provided by Hegel: inasmuch as substance is inde-
terminate immediacy from which no finite content can be deduced, Spinoza’s system is a variant of 
acosmism or ancient Eleatic monism. I.e.: Spinoza is drunk on an idea of God sans determination. See 
Hegel in §151, vol. 1 (“The Science of Logic”) of the Encyclopedia of 1830: “[Spinoza’s philosophy] is, 
indeed, pantheistic precisely on account of its acosmism. […] Substance, just as it is immediately 
construed by Spinoza without the prior dialectical mediation, is, as the universal negative power, 
only this dark shapeless abyss […]” (Hegel 2010, 225). For recent discussion of Spinoza’s reception 
in the era of Novalis, see the collection of papers on Spinoza and German Idealism, ed. Förster and 
Melamed, (2012). For a recent reply to Hegel’s “acosmist” charge, see Melamed (2013), esp. 66-82.
2 The list of recent Spinoza works written in the broadly continental European tradition where “im-
manence” is a central concern is long. E.g.: Ramond (1995), Negri (1982 [1981]), Yovel (1989). Post-
Deleuzian variations on the theme of immanence in Spinoza are also widespread. Consider, for ex., 
Badiou, for whom Spinoza proposes a “closed ontology” (Badiou 1998) or attempts (and, instructively, 




















sustained scholarly attention.3 Yet to my knowledge there has been no 
thorough attempt at crafting a comprehensive image of the stakes of the 
discussion that Deleuze engages with Spinoza regarding the notion of 
immanence. I will show that, in fact, we must account for three stages in 
Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, each of which corresponds roughly 
to a decade of Deleuze’s career and constellates around one work of 
philosophy he published. 
In three ascending experimental and iconoclastic stages, the 
Deleuzian reading of Spinoza qua quintessential philosopher of 
immanence involves: a presentation of Spinoza’s metaphysics of causality 
and the theory of the univocity of being; a discussion of what it is to be 
a reader of Spinoza in light of Spinoza’s theory of the affects; and, last 
but not least, a bold bird’s-eye account of how Spinoza’s philosophy toys 
with a tension in the relation between philosophy and non-philosophy. 
Upon analysis, it will be clear that Deleuze’s immanence-drunk reading 
of Spinoza does not content itself with repeating the facile remark that 
Spinoza identifies God and nature. Although this foundational claim in 
Spinoza may constitute the sounding board of very many immanence-
inclined readings or interpretations of Spinoza — along with, perhaps, 
the way that Spinoza’s naturalism yields an uncompromising critique of 
doctrines of personal immortality — Deleuze’s own interpretation takes 
“immanentism” to designate a wide swath of Spinoza’s commitments 
and conceptual moves that do not remain strictly localizable at the level 
of Spinoza’s onto-theology. The breadth and creativity of Deleuze’s 
immanence-drunk reading of Spinoza deserves the attention it requires 
if we are to salvage this Spinozist immanentism from the risk it has of 
being overwhelmed by simplistic rejoinders. I will, when possible, show 
what I think to be the limits of Deleuze’s reading and where it runs into 
considerable difficulties, but my principal aim is not to do more than 
reconstruct the reading as Deleuze presents it. I take it that a clear 
understanding of precisely how Deleuze ascribes to Spinoza a form of 
extreme immanentism is a precondition for critical work on Deleuze’s 
Spinoza. 
fails) to “ontologically eradicate the void” (Badiou 1988, 137). One can understand this as Badiou’s 
reply to Deleuze’s Spinoza — where Deleuze talks of Spinoza’s doctrine of immanence, Badiou talks 
of Spinoza’s attempt at a foreclosure of “the void” from substance. 
3 E.g. the many contributions included in the volume Spinoza-Deleuze: Lectures croisée, ed. Sauvagn-
argues and Sévérac (2016).




















Immanence as Fundamental Metaphysical Structure in  
Spinoza et le problème de l’expression
The gradual development of Deleuze’s view on immanence in Spinoza 
commences in earnest with the publication of his 1968 work, a secondary 
thesis written under the direction of Ferdinand Alquié and defended at 
the Sorbonne, Spinoza et le problème de l’expression (hereafter “SPE”).4 
When looking to Deleuze’s earliest text on Spinoza and his 
treatment of Spinoza as a thinker of immanence, we may legitimately ask: 
What led Deleuze to attach such importance to the concept of immanence 
in the first place? Perhaps, we might hope, it is a term of art bequeathed 
to Deleuze by the philosophical community to which he belonged, the 
postwar community of practitioners of l’école française de l’histoire de 
la philosophie. For many of these historians of philosophy, Spinoza is a 
central figure of interest; Spinoza scholarship was far from being a poor 
state prior to Deleuze.5 Thus we are led to see if earlier Spinoza literature 
makes strong case(s) for Spinoza as a thinker of immanence. A brief 
survey of the literature suggests, however, that this was not the case. The 
term is absent from Ferdinand Alquié’s published lectures on Spinoza, 
given at the Sorbonne in 1958 and 1959.6 Sylvain Zac makes no use of the 
notion in either of his commentaries from 1963 and 1965 on the idea of 
life in Spinoza and Spinoza’s interpretation of Scripture, respectively.7 
The Spinoza’s collected works Pléiade edition, prepared by Roland 
Caillois, Madeleine Francès, and Robert Misrahi, published in 1955, does 
not include the term “immanence” in the otherwise ample index rerum.8 
Looking further back still to Charles Appuhn,9 Victor Delbos,10 Victor 
4 Deleuze (1968a). Translations my own.
5 See Peden (2014) for an informative history of French Spinozism in the years leading up to Deleuze. 
See also Lærke (2020). Gueroult (1968) and Matheron (1988 [1969]) publish their groundbreaking 
Spinoza monographs at roughly the same moment. Macherey (2011) emphasizes, I do not believe 
accurately, that Spinoza literature in 1968 would have been “carrément en panne” (293), were it not for 
the contributions of Zac (1963), (1965).
6 Alquié (2003 [1958-1959]). Alquié (1981) will however later maintain that “on a toujours considéré que 
Spinoza était parti d’une intuition fondamentale, celle de l’immanence de Dieu” (159), an intuition 
which he disputes led Spinoza to successfully ban any trace of immanence from his philosophy.
7 Zac (1963) and Zac (1965).
8 Spinoza (1955).
9 Appuhn (1927).
10 Delbos (1893), Delbos (1983 [1912-1913]).




















Brochard,11 Émile Lasbax,12 Alain,13 Léon Brunschvicg,14 Jules Lagneau,15 
and Émile Saisset,16 leading figures of more or less traditional academic 
French scholarship on Spinoza in the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, one finds no sustained discussion of immanence in Spinoza. Nor 
does the outlier Romain Rolland (whose essay L’éclair de Spinoza Deleuze 
refers to approvingly in later works) appeal to immanence in Spinoza as a 
way of articulating what makes Spinoza’s philosophy so attractive.17
The exception that makes the rule is provided by Paul Vernière. 
In his 1954 Spinoza et la pensée française avant la Révolution the term 
“immanence” is indexed 12 times.18 The references involve Vernière’s 
presentation of Spinoza’s reception by: Richard Simon19; François 
Fénélon (for whom, claims Vernière, the thesis of the immanence of 
God to the world is at the center of his theodicy)20; Pierre Bayle (who 
disputes, claims Vernière, that Spinoza’s philosophy is a philosophy of 
immanence, as God does not penetrate all things but is all things)21; 
Henry de Boulainviller22; Languener23; Julien Offray de la Mettrie24; Denis 
Diderot (who believes, writes Vernière, that any consistent philosophy 
of immanence such as Spinoza’s must lead us to think that Nature is 
capable of anything whatsoever and thus that ghosts, demons, hellfire, 
etc., are all conceivable)25;Jean-Baptiste Robinet26; and François 
Hemsterhuys.27 
11 Brochard (2013 [1912]).
12 Lasbax (1911).
13 Alain (1996 [1900]).
14 Brunschvicg (1951 [1894/1906]).
15 Lagneau (2020 [1882/1898]).
16 Saisset (1860).
17 Rolland (1931).
18 Vernière (1981 [1954]), 766.
19 Ibid., 234.
20 Ibid., 277.





26 Ibid., 650, 652.
27 Ibid., 670, 671.




















It is immaterial to our purposes here whether Vernière is correct 
to attribute a worry about Spinoza’s immanence to so many thinkers. 
What is important is that the interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy as a 
philosophy of immanence is circulating at the time of Deleuze’s writing. In 
drawing sustained attention to Spinoza as a thinker of immanence in his 
SPE Deleuze builds on a view for which there is prior support, but which 
does not represent as standard fare in Spinoza commentary in French.28
The central point of analysis in SPE is not immanence itself but 
the notion of expression in Spinoza. The discussion of immanence is 
subordinated to the latter. Although there is an entire section of the 
book entitled “Le parallélisme et l’immanence,”29 it is simply not the case 
that Deleuze will develop an interpretation of immanence in that entire 
section. 
The most interesting discussion we find in this early text regarding 
what it means for Spinoza to be a thinker of immanence is presented in 
Chapter 11, “L’immanence et les éléments historiques de l’expression,” 
where Deleuze develops a discussion of how doctrines of immanence 
differ from doctrines of emanation, and not, as might be expected, 
from doctrines of transcendence.30 On Deleuze’s telling, there is a 
conceptual proximity between doctrines of emanation and doctrines 
of immanence. It is this conceptual proximity that masks their genuine 
difference. Both are concerned with making sense of the Platonic theory 
of participation. That Platonic theory responds to a guiding worry in 
28 Admittedly, there is an attractive and simpler explanation on hand for Deleuze’s preoccupation 
with immanence here, viz. the Husserlian influence on Deleuze. Husserl will occupy a non-negligible 
place in Deleuze’s Logique du sens (1969a), where Husserl’s conception of the phenomenological 
method as the interrogation of consciousness’ immanence to itself is questioned. Moreover, both 
Jean Cavaillès and Jean-Toussaint Desanti already draw attention to the role of immanence in Spi-
noza’s philosophy, and this because of the Husserlian influence. See Peden (2014) for more on their 
respective relations to Spinoza. It is doubtful whether Deleuze himself read Cavaillès and Desanti’s 
writings on Spinoza. Zourabichvili (2003), 65-66, denies that Deleuze’s usage of immanence is a Hus-
serlian derivation. For a book length study of Deleuze’s debt to Husserl see Hughes (2008).
Last but not least: One should note that in the important philosophical dictionary by Lalande et al. 
(Lalande (1932) [1902-1923]), the term “immanence” (along with “immanentism”) is indexed and amply 
discussed (vol. 1, 342-347). In connection to that discussion, mention is made of Spinoza’s discussion 
in Ethics I, Proposition 18, as exemplifying how immanent causes are opposed to transitive causes — 
rather than as exemplifying the opposition to transcendence that is ostensibly built into the definition 
of “immanent” as either: (a) meaning that which is comprised in a being and does not result from an 
external action; or (b) meaning that which belongs to a being and structures its or tendency to certain 
outcomes; or (c) meaning, in its Kantian application, that which is enclosed within the limits of pos-
sible experience.
On an aside, the André Lalande dictionary was highly regarded by peers, earning as it did the prize of 
the Académie française, and remains indispensable for assessing the state of philosophical research 
in early-twentieth-century France. Historians of European modern philosophy will recognize this work 
as belonging to the generation of commentators like the Fichtean Xavier Léon, the Leibnizian Louis 
Couturat, and the Spinozist Victor Delbos, along with more well-known figures like Henri Bergson. 
In its indexing and scholarly work, it is reminiscent of Scholastic handbooks by schoolmen like Saint 
Eustachius.
29 Deleuze (1968), 87-169.
30 Deleuze (1968a), 153-169. 




















Plato’s late work: How is the multiplicity of changing empirical objects 
grounded in the immutability of Forms? What explains how the manifold 
of apparent objects depend on the Forms for their reality? Deleuze is 
taking up a familiar trope in Western metaphysics, seeing how Spinoza’s 
immanentism response fits into while repudiating a tradition of accounts 
of the basic metaphysical structure of reality as hierarchically tiered, 
where at the ground level of reality there is enjoyed by whatever being can 
be said to occupy it a fundamentality and priority not enjoyed at other, 
lesser, and derived levels of reality. The Platonic worry, at least as early 
as Aristotle, becomes coded in terms of causality. What kind of causal 
power is exercised by the Forms, or at the level of fundamental reality that 
Plato thinks is peopled by the Forms, that might secure the participation 
relation of the manifold of apparent objects in the Forms? 
Here’s where the Neo-Platonists show up with what seems like a 
Spinozist response if we mistakenly consider Spinoza’s substance or God 
to exercise its power remotely over created beings. Thus, on Deleuze’s 
presentation, the point of resemblance between the emanative cause and 
the immanent cause would be that “[such causes] remain in themselves 
to produce.”31 However, the difference would be more significant still: 
“If the emanative cause remains in itself, the effect produced is not 
in the cause and does not remain in the cause.”32 The Neo-Platonists 
are hence led to emphasize the first hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides: 
the One is superior to Being itself; the cause “produces according to 
what it gives, but remains beyond what it gives.”33 Deleuze wants us to 
consider how the Neoplatonic metaphysical account of the emanation and 
procession of lower-level and degraded beings out of the One superior to 
all Being portrays an infinite cascade of declines in hypostases of reality. 
Neoplatonic ontology has a tiered, hierarchical structure articulated in 
terms of the remoteness of the effect from the emanative cause that is 
the One.34 
Spinoza’s doctrine of immanence, on the other hand, implies 
the equality of being between the underlying, principle cause and its 
consequences, between the radical ground of things and the many things 
which are its effects. For Deleuze, what is most important here — and, on 
my view, central to the project of understanding Spinoza’s immanentism 
that Deleuze sets himself in SPE — is that the fundamental metaphysical 
31 Ibid., 155. 
32 Ibid., 155. 
33 Ibid., 156. The first hypothesis in Plato’s Parmenides is discussed in 137c4-142a8. The importance of 
the first hypothesis to the Neoplatonic thinkers is historically well-documented. See Forrester (1972).
34 By Neo-Platonists, it is fair to assume that first and foremost Deleuze means to designate Ploti-
nus. On the problem of the “procession” of hypostases out of the One, see for ex. Enneads Volume VI, 
Treatise 9, “On the Good or the One” (Plotin, 1994). See also the discussion in Bréhier (2008 [1921-
1938]), 53-62, which may have influenced Deleuze’s own account.




















structure of reality is one of the immanent causal dependence of all things 
on substance, and that, what is more, there is no fundamental hierarchy 
in being, since no scale of superiority and inferiority in being can be 
established between an immanent cause and its effects:
“That which defines the immanent cause is that the effect is in the 
cause, no doubt as in another thing, but is and remains it in. The 
effect remains no less in the cause than the cause remains in itself. 
From this point of view, the distinction in essence between cause 
and effect will never be interpreted as a degradation. From the point 
of view of immanence, the distinction in essence does not exclude, 
but implies an equality of being: it is the same being that remains 
in itself in the cause, and in which the effect remains as in another 
thing.”35 
Spinoza’s immanentism, we may say, has to do with Spinoza’s 
metaphysics being a “pure ontology” — that is, it establishes the pure 
affirmation of Being:
“Immanence implies a pure ontology, a theory of Being where the 
One is only the property of substance and that which is. What is 
more, immanence in its pure state demands the principle of the 
equality of being or the position of Being-equal: not only is being 
in equal in itself, but being appears equally present in all beings. 
And the Cause, equally close everywhere: there is no remote cause. 
Beings are not defined according to their rank on a hierarchy, are no 
more or less removed from the One, but each depends directly on 
God, participating in the equality of being, receiving immediately 
all that it can receive according to the aptitude of its essence, 
independently from all proximity or remoteness. […] Immanence 
is opposed to any eminence of the cause, any negative theology, 
any method of analogy, any hierarchical conception of the world. 
Everything is affirmation in immanence.”36 
Spinoza’s doctrine can be qualified as a form of immanentism in light of 
the anti-hierarchical way he construes the fundamental metaphysical 
35 Ibid., 156. This has recently been referred to as the immanent cause being the “metaphysical sub-
ject” of its effect. See Zylstra (2020).
36 Ibid., 157. Cf. ibid., 51: “The philosophy of Spinoza is a philosophy of pure affirmation. Affirmation is 
the speculative principle on which all of the Ethics depends.” Deleuze’s suggestion that “everything 
is affirmation” for a philosophy of immanence is likely intended to resonate with Spinoza’s conatus 
doctrine, according to which no negation belongs to the essence of a thing. On Deleuze’s reading in 
SPE, the conatus of a finite thing, the degree of power that circumscribes the essence of the thing, is 
an individuating “quantitative intensity” (178-180). For replies, see Ramond (1995), 194-205. (See also 
discussion in Section 2.)




















structure of reality.37 On an equal basis (but, with the caveat, “according 
to the aptitude” of their essences), all things express the causally 
powerful and fundamentally divine, prodigious, and creative character 
of Nature. That is, all things are “affirmations” in Spinoza’s ontology, 
and this is the bedrock of what it means to ascribe to immanentism in 
metaphysics. At this early and yet still quite “academic” point of his 
career, for Deleuze, the deepest facts about metaphysical structure in 
Spinoza are causal in character.38
What does “affirmation” mean for Deleuze? In common 
philosophical usage, the term designates the logical act that unites a 
proposition to a subject but also some propositional attitudes that are 
brought to bear on propositions (“The door is closed” but also “I believe 
the door is closed.”). Surveying Spinoza, we find the controversial 
epistemological stance in Ethics Part 2, Proposition 49 and Scholium, 
where Spinoza examines the untenability of the distinction between the 
understanding and the will. That is, for Spinoza, propositions always 
present themselves burdened with propositional attitudes. To form 
or conceive an idea in the understanding is already to affirm what we 
conceive, or judge it with the will, as a function of the self-positing power 
of the idea itself. One can see how, at least in this regard, “everything” for 
Spinoza — that is, everything insofar all things are modes of thought — is 
truly an affirmation.39 Similarly, in Deleuze, we may say that “affirmation” 
connotes something akin to a position in existence or a self-positing 
37 Regarding the equality of all creatures or finite things compared to God or substance, see also Ep. 
54 (G IV 253, l. 5-20), where in discussion with Hugo Boxel Spinoza writes: “Your second argument 
[on why spirits exist] is that because spirits are more like God than the other, corporeal creatures, it 
is also probable that God created them. Truly, I confess I still don’t know in what respect spirits are 
more like God than other creatures are. I know this: that there is no proportion between the finite and 
the infinite; so the difference between the greatest, most excellent creature and God is the same as 
that between the least creature and God.”.
38 This interpretation finds additional support in both Curley (1969) and Gueroult (1968). It is com-
monly (and wrongly) asserted that the metaphysical grounding of mode in substance is the central 
component of immanentism for Deleuze tout court. Thus, Frim and Fluss (2018) argue in conclusion 
to a recent study that Spinoza “accepts immanence” (read: Deleuze is correct) if by which we mean 
“modes inhere in God” but not if by which we mean “Spinoza precludes all notions of emanation or 
hierarchy, as the procession of infinite modes suggests” (214). They are right to think that in SPE 
the problem of immanentism is posed at the level of the relation of modes to God, but the inherence 
relation, for Deleuze, receives little attention compared to the causal one. What is more, Spinoza’s 
ontology of infinite modes does not, I take it, lead to the hierarchization of being in a way that poses 
problems for Deleuze’s reading. To follow Deleuze, it would be nonsensical to think of infinite modes 
as more eminent or closer to God than any finite mode. Take the laws of motion and rest that follow 
immediately from the attribute of extension and are infinite in this respect. The laws insofar as they 
are determined as finite quantities of motion and rest in the form of finite modes of extension are not 
any less affirmations of being than the laws insofar as they are determined as immediate infinite con-
sequences of extension. However, if we consider that between any two modes, that one mode can be 
more perfect or contain more reality than another mode, by virtue of the fact that no two finite modes 
will have the same amount of power to persevere in their being, it is fair to say that here we have to 
seriously wonder whether Deleuze’s interpretation can do the job. (See fn. 49 and infra, Section 2 of 
paper, for the discussion of “intensive magnitudes”.) 
39 For more on this point, see Della Rocca (2012) and Ramond (1998).




















in the world, a positivity, or (to think in broadly Spinozist terms) an 
expression of power and perseverance in being or conatus.40
We may in any case say that at this early stage of Deleuze’s 
work, Spinoza’s immanentism is hence primarily, if not exclusively, a 
metaphysical commitment. As seen, Deleuze’s reading taps into broad 
implications of the nature of the causal relation between God and God’s 
effects in Spinoza’s philosophy. Let us examine Deleuze’s reading of 
Spinoza’s metaphysics of causality a bit more and see how it stacks up 
with other aspects of his reading along with other aspects of Spinoza’s 
own text.
Looking to Spinoza, we find in Ethics Part 1 Proposition 18 
and Demonstration that he equates God’s being an immanent (or 
“indwelling”) cause with, as Spinoza writes, the fact that “Deus rerum, 
quae in ipso sunt, est causa” — “God is the cause of things which are in 
it”. Therefore, in consequence of the fact that there is no other substance 
nor any thing not “in God”, God is the immanent and not the transitive 
cause of all things. God could be a transitive cause only if what God 
caused was not in God, if God overlooked their Creation, as in the vulgar 
imagination of God as kinglike. It is not straight-away clear whether 
this point of causal metaphysics grounds the equalizing of things’ 
“affirmations” of reality, as Deleuze stipulates it logically must. However, 
as Deleuze rightly emphasizes, considered in terms of their ontological 
position, their “remoteness” or “proximity” to God qua substance, all 
things are equally situated and participate equally in divinity or nature.41 
Following Deleuze, Spinoza’s view here echoes the anti-
Aristotelian (and, for Deleuze, anti-theological) doctrine that being 
is univocal or only admits of one meaning, that “to be” can be said in 
one way only. In the chapter on “the Names of God” in SPE, Deleuze 
explicitly connects the two doctrines in discussing Spinoza’s distinction 
of the attributes in God in terms of Duns Scot’ theory of the formal 
distinction. The attributes would be distinct by virtue of a real distinction, 
that is not a mere distinction of reason, yet this formal distinction 
remains non-numerical.42 The Scotist formal distinction provides us with 
40 The connection of “affirmation” with the conatus doctrine is explicitly made by Spinoza himself, 
when he writes in Ethics Part 3 Proposition 4 Scholium that: “The definition of a thing affirms, and 
does not deny, the essence of the thing; in other words, it poses the essence of the thing and does not 
suppress it.”
41 See fn. 37, supra.
42 Deleuze (1968a), 54-57, esp. 56, in fine: “All attributes formally distinct are related by the under-
standing to an ontologically unique substance [une substance ontologiquement une]. But the under-
standing only reproduces objectively the nature of forms that it apprehends. All formal essences 
form the essence of a single substance which is absolutely singular [une substance absolument une]. 
All the substances qualified form a single substance from the point of view of quantity. Thus, the 
attributes themselves have an identity in being and a formal distinction; ontologically one, formally 
diverse, this is the status of attributes.”




















an “absolutely coherent conception of the unity of substance and the 
plurality of attributes,” yet unlike his illustrious predecessor, Spinoza 
does not shy away from the pantheistic implications: “In Spinoza, 
univocal Being is perfectly determined in its concept as that which is 
said in one and the same way about substance which is in itself, and 
about modes which are in another.”43 Thus, with Spinoza, “univocity 
becomes the object of pure affirmation,” and it is the burden of the “idea 
of the immanent cause” to take up the challenge and carry the charge of 
univocity, “liberating it from the indifference and neutrality where it had 
been maintained by the theory of divine creation” — it is “in immanence 
that univocity finds its properly Spinozist formulation: God is said cause 
of all things in the same way (eo sensu) that it is said cause of itself.”44
This implicit appeal on Deleuze’s part to Ethics Part 1 Proposition 
25 Scholium is elucidatory. In that scholium, Spinoza argues that 
it follows from Proposition 16 that God is the efficient cause of the 
existence of things as much as God is the efficient cause of the essence 
of things. Proposition 16 itself tells us that infinitely many modes 
necessarily follow from the nature of God. Hence, Spinoza effectively 
rides together the view that given God’s nature infinitely many things 
must follow (and that these things depend on God both regarding their 
essence and existence), and the suggestion that God causes itself in the 
same way that it causes all things, that is by virtue of efficient causality. 
It is reasonable to agree with Deleuze that a Spinozist account of being’s 
univocity is at play here, one that does involve a move to a theory of 
causation. The causal relation between God and any other being is the 
same causal relation that God entertains with itself, and this is meant 
to secure the univocity (and unicity) of the self-causing substance. But 
how does immanent causation relate to the doctrine of efficient self-
causation? That is a puzzling problem that oversteps the bounds of our 
discussion. To venture a guess, one might think that, for Deleuze, at the 
level of ultimate reality, efficient self-causation is actually conceivable 
in light of the fact that the causal schema in play is one where the effect 
remains as much in the cause as the cause itself does. In this way, the 
apparent nonsense involved in thinking of a cause that would pre-exist 
itself dissipates, since the cause remains “within itself” when causing its 
effects, which also remain in it.45
43 Ibid., 58.
44 Ibid., 58.
45 In Deleuze (1969b), a review of Gueroult (1968), Deleuze returns to this theory of the univocity and 
unity of God’s causal act in connection with his exposition of Gueroult’s “genetico-structuralist” 
method. Here, the immanence of God’s causal work clarifies a methodological point in Gueroult: “[If] 
one and the other are said in one and the same way (God, cause of all things in the same sense as 
cause of itself”, it is because the genesis of modes is in the attributes, and would not be immanent if 
the attributes themselves were not genealogical elements of substance. In this manner appears the 
methodological unity of all of Spinozism as a genetic philosophy” (432).




















In reading Deleuze, however, we should be careful not to confuse 
this understanding of Spinoza as a thinker of the univocity of being with 
the Hegelian interpretation of Spinoza’s acosmism.46 There should be no 
question that Deleuze does not conflate the two positions. In Différence 
et répétition (the thèse d’État complementing the secondary thesis SPE), 
Deleuze writes that what is most fundamental to the fecundity of the 
theory of univocity of being is not simply that being is said in one and the 
same way, for a further consideration is involved that bears on the nature 
of difference in being or between beings: “Being is said, in one and the 
same way, of all individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. […] It 
is of the essence of univocal being to relate to individuating differences, 
but these differences do not have the same essence, and do not vary 
the essence of being.”47 In Deleuze’s happy turn of phrase, “Being is 
said in one and the same way of any thing of which it is said, but that of 
which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself” (“L’Être se dit en 
un seul et même sens de tout ce dont il se dit, mais ce dont il se dit diffère 
: il se dit de la différence elle-même”).48 The metaphysics of Difference 
and Repetition congenially maps onto the reading of Spinoza in SPE, 
which we may presume was being executed at about the same moment. 
The ant is extended in the same way as the cosmos is extended, which 
is no different than the way that God is extended as Natura naturata or 
God is extension as Natura naturans. To be extended means to express 
an irreducible aspect of God, which all things do equally, even when 
all things remain distinct; it is nonsense to say the ant is more, or is 
differently, or is inferiorly extended than any other thing, that it “affirms” 
extension any less or any more than any other thing. We needn’t try to 
clear up here how Spinoza’s concept of “expression” is inseparable from 
the doctrine of immanence on Deleuze’s view. Nor should we proffer a 
further complication for Deleuze’s reading by introducing, as Spinoza 
himself does, a quasi-hierarchical ranking system for finite modes, as 
finite modes have “more” or “less” powers to act and exist. (A point 
which Deleuze does not entirely overlook, specifically insofar as he 
characterizes Spinozist essences of finite things as “quantitative” (that 
is greater or lesser) “intensities” — thereby providing an implicit scale 
for their ranking and evaluation.49) It is sufficient for our purposes that we 
46 See fn. 1, supra.
47 Deleuze (1968b), 53.
48 Ibid., 53. In Logique du sens, Deleuze substantially develops his (Spinozist) notion of the univocity 
of being and resolutely contrasts it with the kind of acosmism that has haunted Spinoza literature 
since the German pantheismusstreit. E.g. Deleuze (1969a), 210: “The univocity of being does not mean 
that there is only one and the same being. On the contrary, beings are multiple and different, always 
produced by a disjunctive synthesis, themselves disjoined and divergent, membra disjuncta.” For more 
on the “disjunctive synthesis” see Zourabichvili (2003), 78-80. 
49 Interestingly, the hierarchical character of being further forms a crucial part of Deleuze’s own 




















have shown how, at this early stage of his reflection on Spinoza’s doctrine 
of immanence, the central aim of Deleuze’s interpretation is to emphasize 
the anti-hierarchical impulse underpinning the building blocks of 
Spinoza’s metaphysics. In 1968, it was Spinoza’s refusal to countenance 
an account of reality as ontologically tiered that underpinned Deleuze’s 
empathy for his philosophy.
Immanence in Media Res in Spinoza, Philosophie Pratique
Deleuze’s second work on Spinoza, Spinoza, Philosophie pratique 
(hereafter “SPP”), was published twice. Only in the second edition of 
1981 does one find the decisive conclusion, “Spinoza et nous”, written 
originally in 1978. Thus, it is the second edition that will be of interest to 
us here. Deleuze’s Spinozism has sensibly matured in the intervening 
years. A new and pivotal term in Deleuze’s vocabulary will be put forward 
in SPP to articulate the meaningfulness of immanence not only in 
Spinoza but in philosophy in general: “the plane of immanence”. No doubt 
the swelling of creativity here has something to do with the philosophical 
fecundity of those intervening years spent working on Capitalisme et 
schizophrénie with Félix Guattari and teaching at the newly founded 
Université de Vincennes. And the image of a “plane” or flat, smooth 
surface, naturally resonates with the image of the “plateau” informing 
their masterwork, Mille plateaux.50 There is one final resonance of the 
term. In the famous prologue to the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, 
Spinoza’s narrator writes of their need for a fixed “plan of life” or novum 
institutum.51 Similarly, the “plane” of immanence is something of a 
“plan” — a sort of orientation or disposition, a Spinozist arrangement (or 
assemblage, “agencement”)52 with and/or of what we have now, following 
Deleuze in SPE, accustomed ourselves to calling “being” — Nature or 
God. Spinoza’s practical thought, that is Spinozism itself, is more than 
ontology, as well as being emphasized in various other historical works, such as in his first work on 
Nietzsche. See Deleuze (1962), esp. regarding Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return of the same 
and its signifying that “being is selection” (217). For its role in Deleuze’s ontology, see Deleuze 
(1968b), esp. 54 in fine.
50 If one listens carefully enough, one can discern how “le plan” distantly echoes “la plaine” and “le 
plein” – that is, the term evokes a flat space conducive to “nomadism” in addition to the plenitude of 
being and its affirmatory character. Musical imagery inhabits Deleuze (e.g.: “la ritournelle” or, more 
central for our purposes here, the “rhythms” that characterize the way Spinoza’s finite things enter in 
relation with one another) and it should come as no surprise that he would himself attempt a kind of 
musicality of concepts. 
51 TIE §3.
52 The typical translation of agencement as “assemblage” is very odd, despite its pedigree. A bit of 
etymology might help here. The verb agencer is derived in the 13th-century from *gent, from the Latin 
*genitus, “born”. Thus, the original meaning of agencer: to embellish, as in make noble (or high-born). 
From there it takes on the modern meaning: to arrange or put into order. See Bloch and Wartburg 
(1932), 292. Un agencement is an arrangement, of furniture in a living room or flowers in a vase. It con-
notes things being well-disposed to achieve a desired higher purpose. 




















just a view on how God causes its effects. SPP thus opens a new horizon 
for interrogating Spinoza’s philosophy and understanding what it means 
for us to be readers of Spinoza.
SPP’s conclusion, “Spinoza et nous”, is a very difficult text. This is 
somewhat ironic as Deleuze’s overall aim is to emphasize how there is a 
way in which we can read Spinoza without any philosophical training or 
preparation, letting the affective dimension of the text instruct us, and 
come away a bona fide Spinozist. Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza as 
constructing a “plane of immanence” in SPP is, we may say, meant to 
respond to a serious existential worry in the interpretation of Spinoza: How 
do we live as Spinozists? What does it mean to read Spinoza? Better yet: 
How is it in reading Spinoza that we learn what it is to live meaningfully in 
the hurly-burly world of encounters, affects, and multiplicities? In asking 
this question, the Spinozist text has already been reframed. Since we come 
to Spinoza in media res, so we must take up Spinoza in media res, not from 
“the first principle” but in the middle.53 
Any reader of Spinoza confronts the difficulty Deleuze’s approach 
means to untangle. Spinoza’s more geometrico forces the commentator 
to move backward while moving forward, like a crab, as it were; the need 
to reiterate and recall basic positions in Spinoza’s metaphysics as a way 
of justifying any later position means repeating ad nauseam the same old 
story. (In Ethics Part 2, in the scholium to Lemma 7 after Proposition 13, 
Spinoza himself seems to hint at the “prolix” or verbose and long-winded 
character of his more geometrico.) The consequences for the understanding 
of Spinoza are quite unfortunate. We dull the affective edge of the 
philosophical text. 
This explains a second point in connection with Deleuze’s 
interpretation. For Deleuze, the Ethics does not exist. Rather, there are 
multiplicities of Ethics. In SPP (as was already the case in the appendix 
to SPE),54 there are two Ethics: the slow geometric unfolding of concepts 
above, and the lava flow of explosive scholia and polemics, the affective 
intensities underneath.55 In his short and final work to be published on 
Spinoza, “Spinoza et les trois Éthiques,”56 Deleuze maintains there are 
three Ethics, a point which he anticipates in the Conclusion to SPP. Ethics 
“Book V” is truly a work apart, not because of its difficulty, but because 
53 Deleuze (2003 [1981]), 164. Translations my own. Cf. 166.
54 The earliest formulation of the view is in Deleuze (1968a), 313-322.
55 Deleuze (2003), 174-175. See also the footnote on 159-160: “The greater part of the Ethics is written 
from the point of view of the common notions and the second kind of knowledge; Spinoza explicitly 
recalls this in E5p36s and E5p41d. The third kind of knowledge only appears in Part 5, whence its differ-
ence of rhythm and movement.” (Our emphasis). Strangely in SPP Deleuze seems to have forgotten the 
lesson of the appendix to SPE: the scholia are “independent” with respect to the propositions that they 
“double” (317). 
56 Deleuze (1993).




















it is so fast. The theory of textual velocities will prove fundamental to 
Deleuze’s general interpretation: 
“[…] It is Book V, which is not at all the most difficult, but the 
fastest, of an infinite speed, that the two, the philosopher and the 
non-philosopher, are reunited as one and the same being. What 
an extraordinary composition this Book V, and how it makes for 
the encounter [rencontre] of concept and affect. And how this 
encounter is prepared, and made necessary by the celestial and 
subterranean movements that together compose the preceding 
books.”57
Spinoza’s “plane of immanence” is also called the “common plane of 
immanence”58 or the “plane of consistency.”59 One of its defining features 
is to give rise to the continual re-composition and de-composition of 
whatever populates it; hence, for Deleuze, the principal relation between 
beings in Spinoza’s ontology of singular things is one of composition. 
A plane of immanence thereby involves that which is common, insofar 
as it is a realm of relationality and communication. Communities are 
continually established, communities which also provide room for 
“intensities”, and which outwardly extend into ever-new communal or 
social relations.60 
Deleuze is at pains to emphasize that any singular thing, for 
Spinoza, just is a relation of relations with no bottoming out in sight, a 
composition or play of forces localized on an infinite field of forces — a 
reading which conjures an image reminiscent of the facies totius universi 
evoked in Spinoza’s July 1675 letter to G. H. Schuller.61 The Spinozist 
intuition of the irreducibly relational nature of what appear to be discrete 
beings calls for a novel language of analysis:
“In short: If we are Spinozists, we do not define a thing by its form, 
nor by its organs and functions, nor as substance or subject. To 
borrow terms from the Middle Ages, or from geography, we define 
it by its longitude and latitude. A body can be whatever, it can be an 
animal, it can be a sonorous body, a linguistic body, it can be a social 
body, a collectivity. We call the longitude of the body the totality of 
relations of speed and slowness, or rest and movement, between the 
57 Deleuze (2003), 174.
58 Ibid., 164.
59 Ibid., 164, 168.
60 Ibid., 169.
61 Ep. 64.




















particles that compose it from this point of view; that is, between 
unformed elements. We call the latitude of the body the totality 
of affects that fill up the body at every moment, that is to say the 
intensive states of an anonymous force (force of existence, power to 
be affected). In such a way we establish the cartography of the body. 
The totality of longitudes and latitudes constitutes Nature, the plane 
of immanence or consistence, always variable, and which does not 
cease to be reworked, composed, recomposed by individuals and 
collectivities.”62
The Ethics, like any other book for that matter,63 is a singular thing, “un 
corps quelconque”. It too is just a “agencement” or a batch of relations 
with Being, a bouquet of variable compositions (it has a longitude), and it 
too is shot through with an affective “anonymous force” (it has a latitude). 
Like any other singular body, the relations are rhythmic in character; the 
motion of the text, the movement of Spinozist thought occurs here faster, 
there slower. We readers of Spinoza selectively embrace those rhythms in 
our encounter with Spinoza.64 While Deleuze himself posits that there are 
two rhythms in the Ethics that structure its organization (and later three), 
Deleuze’s ear for the myriad Ethics ties into the broader theory of the 
plane of immanence as a field of relational and centrifugal compositional 
processes. The plane of immanence distributes multiplicities.
Further involved in Spinoza’s “plane of immanence” is what 
Deleuze calls the “typology of immanent modes of existence” or the 
“ethology”.65 Bodies are interrogated in terms of how their intensive 
affect-grounding character is expressed in extensive compositions, that 
is, in terms of their complex manner of existence.
62 Deleuze (2003), 171.
63 In the introduction to Mille plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari explicitly elaborate a theory of “the 
book” as one kind of “agencement”. See Deleuze and Guattari (1980), 9-37. As interesting as it is, I 
will not discuss here the famous passage in Mille plateaux where Spinoza Ethics earns the title of 
“being the great book on the BwO (CsO = corps sans organes)” (190), despite the fact that the “BwO” 
is explicitly connected to the “plane of immanence of desire”. For discussion, see Negri (2020).
64 Deleuze (2003), 166. The idea of “rhythms” of fast and slow motion is a translation, as it were, of 
Spinoza’s talk of the “certain and determinate ratio of motion and rest that characterizes the essence 
of a body. See the “physical interlude” after Ethics Part 2 Proposition 13 Scholium.
65 One can consider the entirety of Deleuze (2003), Chapter 3 (“The Letters on Evil”), a development 
on this theme. Cf. the succinct summary of “ethology” on Deleuze (2003), 168. 
Sharp (2011) argues that the “ethological” turn in Deleuze’s SPP renews the anti-hierarchical and 
horizontal constitution of a flat ontology by means of the renaturalization of the human being. I have 
shown that the anti-hierarchical impulse lies at the heart of Deleuze’s interpretation in SPE. I am 
therefore sympathetic to Sharp’s interpretation although I do not think that the originality of SPP lies 
in the anti-hierarchical turn; rather, its originality lies in its theorization of the plane of immanence as 
such. This moves the center of gravitation in Deleuze’s discussion of Spinoza away from the ground-
level talk of deep metaphysical facts about substance, attribute, and mode, towards a more applied 
(“practical”) concern with the way that we as readers embody Spinoza’s thinking and fulfill Spinoza’s 
philosophical project.




















Spinoza conceives of any body as a multiplicity of bodies — a 
certain and determinate ratio of motion and rest relates a multiplicity of 
bodies as one single body.66 This multiplicity in nature implies that the 
one and the same body can be pulled in several directions at the same 
time, and is what makes for the complexity of the body and its rich ray 
of affects. For instance, we can be both gladdened and saddened by the 
sight of a friend, as one part of the body can enter into one motion while 
another part into a contrary motion.67 In building on this, Deleuze wants 
to show us that Spinoza’s account of our being’s multi-rhythmic nature 
draws on a further fundamental feature of Spinoza’s immanentism and 
the ethological project, namely that that the essence or nature of any 
finite mode is intrinsically individuated from any other finite mode by 
virtue of its degree of intensity.
The notion of “intensity” (and/or “intensive magnitude”) is certainly 
a term of art.68 Though it figures in the systems of both Kant and Hegel, 
it is perhaps Bergson who drew Deleuze’s attention to it.69 For Bergson, 
the term “intensive” contrasts with “extensive” or that which has the 
property of being in space (In contemporary jargon, this broadly maps 
onto a familiar distinction between internal or subjective first-person 
qualia and material states.). Yet “in the idea of intensity, and even in the 
word that translates it, we find the image of a present contraction and 
consequently a future dilation, the image of a virtual extension and, if 
we can speak this way, a comprised space.”70 For Bergson, the way that 
we employ quantifying or numerical language for talking about feelings, 
pains, pleasures, and other subjective states is fundamentally based on 
a psychological (and metaphysical) illusion, where we incorrectly import 
familiar trains of thought about extensive reality into our discussions 
of our inner reality. Thus, we find Bergson critiquing the notion of 
intensive magnitudes. A so-called “degree of intensity” is demonstrably 
66 This is the definition of “individuum” given in the “physical interlude” of Ethics Part 2 following 
Proposition 13 and Scholium.
67 For Spinoza, insofar as we conceive ideas of bodily states as caused by externally present objects, 
that is, insofar as we imagine our affective states, we are necessarily subject to these kinds of con-
flicts in our nature, or “fluctuations of the soul”. See Ethics Part 3 Proposition 17 Scholium. 
68 Lalande (1932) gives a clear rendition of what “intensity” may have meant for many in Deleuze’s 
day: “term. ‘Intensity’: character of that which admits greater or lesser states, but in such a way that 
the difference between two such states is not itself a degree of that which is susceptible of augmen-
tation or diminution; for ex., a feeling of pain can be greater or lesser, but the difference between a 
light pain and a stronger pain is not a degree of pain that can be compared to others, unlike the way 
that the difference between two lengths or numbers is itself a length or number which has its place 
on a scale of magnitudes” (v. 1, 390).
69 Cf.: Kant’s discussion in chapter 2 of the Analytic of Principles in his KRV (Kant, 1998, 290-295); 
Hegel in §103, vol. 1 (“The Science of Logic”) of the Encyclopedia of 1830 (Hegel, 2010, 162-164); and 
Bergson (1927), chapter 1. See also Ramond (1995), 194-205. 
70 Bergson (1927 [1888]), 3.




















inconceivable. It is a notion in the employment of which we wish to 
quantify things (read, for Bergson: subjective qualia) that, in fact, we  
do not know how to quantify (read, for Bergson: that are not extended  
in space). 
In SPP, Deleuze’s understanding of how variable and quantitative 
determinations of our intensive character stand as the intrinsic 
markers of our being is knotted up with the way that Spinoza’s plane of 
immanence sets the stage for the unfolding of the account of the affects.71 
On the plane of immanence, where multiplicities are always redistributed, 
and where our own multiple natures are always open to redistribution, our 
own personal passage from a lesser to a greater intensive state results 
from the recomposing of our nature in the extensive relations through 
which we present exist in duration.72 In this way, Deleuze believes, all of 
existence becomes for Spinoza a “test” or “trial”73 — an examination of 
whether our intensive and eternal or singular nature effectively expresses 
itself in contemporaneity with our present existence, that is insofar as 
some relation x of extensive parts instantiates in duration, grounding our 
present existence. But the affects become the only available guideposts 
here. Only the experience of our active affects can reliably testify to the 
truth of our natures as degrees of intensity, that is expressions of being’s 
self-affirming power. One is thus presented with what is effectively a 
theory of the point of contact between the un-extended and the extended, 
quality and quantity, pace Bergson.
To further understand the stakes of Deleuze’s interpretation here, 
it bears underscoring that, for Spinoza, the “affect” (affectus) does 
seem to involve two poles of a person’s being. Any affect is the idea of 
the body’s “transition” or “passage” (transitio) from between states of 
perfection; hence we may say, with Deleuze, that it effectively designates 
a relation between states of perfection. The greater perfection gives 
way to the lesser perfection, or the lesser perfection gives way to the 
greater perfection. In both cases, the mind forms a corresponding idea or 
affect. Joy, laetitia, is an idea of the body’s passage from lesser to greater 
perfection, that is, the body’s flourishing, whereas sadness, tristitia, 
71 Actually, it seems there is some equivocation or evolution in the meaning of “intensity” in Spinoza, 
for Deleuze. In SPE, the “intensity” of a mode was strictly identified with the intrinsic principle of 
individuation of that mode, i.e. its eternal essence included in the attribute. Deleuze emphasizes 
there that “the difference of beings (essences of modes) is both intrinsic and purely quantitative, as 
the quantity here is an intensive quantity. […] [E]ach finite being must be said to express the absolute, 
according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence, that is according to its degree of 
power” (Deleuze, 1968a, 180).
72 In the earlier SPE, Deleuze carefully documents this Spinozist position on the theory of the finite 
mode as consisting in the claim that “to exist is to presently have a very great number of parts” where 
“these compositional parts are exterior to the essence of the mode and exterior to one another: these 
are extensive parts” (Deleuze, 1968a, 183).
73 Deleuze (2003), 58.




















implies the passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.74 
It should be no surprise, then, that Deleuze considers the Spinozist 
theory of the affect to be a fine candidate for the mantelpiece of his 
interpretation of Spinoza’s immanentism in SPP. Affects are relational 
in nature, too; and insofar as the mind is the idea of the body, we find 
ourselves “in the middle” of an affective bath or network of emotions 
from our first to our last days. Affects are the way the mind conceives 
the degree or amount of perfection of the body; the affect is conceived 
when our being intensifies and enriches, or when, conversely, it is 
distended and washed away by external forces. For Deleuze, the affect 
involves a relational “arrangement” (agencement) of intrinsic capacities 
and powers, and it invokes the way that the mind is always relating two 
poles of its body’s nature, lesser and greater reality or perfection, in its 
“encounters” with other bodies:
“Studies that define bodies, animals, or people in terms of the 
affects of which they are capable have founded what today we 
call ethology. This is as true of us, people, as much as it is true of 
animals, as nobody knows in advance the affects of which they 
are capable. It is a long affair of experimentation, a long prudence, 
a Spinozist wisdom that implies the construction of a plane of 
immanence or consistence. Spinoza’s Ethics has nothing to do 
with a morality; he conceives it as an ethology, that is to say a 
composition of speed and slowness, of powers of affecting and 
being affected on this plane of immanence. Spinoza cries out: You 
do not know what you are capable of, for better or worse, you do not 
know in advance what a body or a mind can do, in such an encounter 
[rencontre], in such an arrangement [agencement], in such a 
combination.”75
The plane of immanence is a plane of affirmative conjunction and the 
embracing of rhythms of motion, of immersion into relations. The relation 
is a compound of relations, but it is only ever a disjunctive synthesis. On 
the plane of immanence, where being is univocal, each being affirms its 
own character as a multiplicity, an opening onto a surface of relations 
and encounters which it learns to ride, to glide over (“planer”) without 
being dissolved. Following Deleuze, a finite individual body might be 
best described as a para-consistent set of affective relations, a pattern 
of affective capacity and power. This is why the plane of immanence is 
also called plane of consistency. Spinoza’s ontological units, the quanta 
of motion and rest that correspond to eternal truths, are the standard-
74 See esp. Ethics Part 3 Proposition 11 Scholium.
75 Deleuze (2003), 168.




















bearers of the theory of immanence as a whole, where what it is to be 
a thing is to consistently affirm a nature in an outward expansiveness, 
a capacity for affects and a power of composition. How consistent, 
or consistent up to what point? “Nul ne sait ce que peut un corps” – 
that is, nobody knows in advance when the composition becomes a 
decomposition.76 For that, there is, again, l’épreuve éthique; it’s a matter 
of a “long affair of experimentation” — it is a question of successfully 
selecting against “des mauvais rencontres,” “bad encounters,” conceived 
by Spinoza along the model of poisons and intoxicants.77
It is crucial that the plane of immanence remain sans supplementary 
dimension of meaning or interiority. Yet it would seem that Deleuze’s 
reading is strained on account of the central role that he thinks intensive 
states occupy in Spinoza. Transcendence inevitably suggests a place 
“beyond” the mundane, a higher realm, God on a throne, Providential 
oversight… It needn’t, as talk of transcendence might also refer to 
something contained within and squirreled away on the inside as it were, 
a subtracted space untouched by the commerce of all things. But what is 
an “intensity” if not a qualitatively enriched inner world, a thickening and 
deepening development? Hence, a major difficulty for Deleuze’s reading 
in SPP would be why these “intensities” do not preserve an element of 
transcendence in Spinoza’s immanentism.78 
The wrinkle in Deleuze’s articulation of Spinoza’s “cartography” 
aside, Deleuze emphatically underlines how Spinoza leaves no stone 
unturned in the hunt for transcendence. The extirpation of the Cartesian 
subject, of a mind that exists somehow outside of its faculty for thought, 
of a body that exists somehow underneath its capacity for affects, is just 
the polemical component of an irreducible drive in Spinoza qua thinker of 
immanence to abolish the meaning of the distinction between interior and 
exterior:
“Never is an animal, a thing, separable from its relations with 
the world: the interior is only a selected exterior; the exterior, 
a projected interior; the rapidity or slowness of metabolisms, 
perceptions, actions and reactions link up one after the other to 
constitute such or such an individual in the world.”79
The abolition of the interior/exterior division echoes Deleuze’s recurrent 
talk of “surfaces” and the way in which meaning only dwells at the level 
76 A point which already surfaces in Deleuze (1968a). See 193 et sq.
77 Ibid., 61, for the account of “bad encounters” as poisons. Zourabichvili (2002) further develops the 
Deleuzian understanding of the notions of sickness and intoxication in Spinoza. 
78 A point similarly underlined in Ramond (1995), 203-204.
79 Deleuze (2003), 168-169.




















of surfaces as a fragile effect of their interplay. Spinoza’s ostensibly flat 
ontology thus serves as a sounding bar for the intuition that Deleuze also 
finds at work in Lewis Carroll or in the Stoics in his 1969 Logique du sens. 
Depth is only an illusion of perspective. 
Admittedly, the older interpretation of the meaning of “immanence” 
in Spinoza has not been totally discarded in SPP, as we see if we turn 
to the “Index of principal concepts in the Ethics”.80 The index dates from 
1970, however. The book presents us with multiple strata in Deleuze’s 
thinking on immanence in Spinoza. If the earlier emphasis on Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of causality is residual, the emphasis on Spinoza’s 
“ethology” as a project for living on and thinking through the plane of 
immanence will dominate the character of Deleuze’s final meditations on 
Spinoza and immanence.
Spinoza & the Purest Plane of Immanence in 
Qu’est-ce que La philosophie ?
With the late text Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (hereafter: “QQPH?”), 
Deleuze — accompanied by Félix Guattari — provides us with a third 
and final version of the story of Spinoza’s significance as a thinker of 
immanence.81 Furthering the earlier development in the conception 
of Spinoza’s immanentism we find at work in SPP, Deleuze and 
Guattari eschew any facile conception of immanence in favor of a very 
idiosyncratic one. Indeed, the term “immanence” now has a particularly 
restricted, technical meaning, as involved in what Deleuze and Guattari 
call “the plane of immanence.” As we have seen, this mutation in 
conceptual terminology was also anticipated and prepared by the earlier 
works. Although not exclusively spoken of in connection to the plane 
immanence, the plane of immanence plays the key role in the final story 
here of Spinoza’s philosophy’s enduring meaningfulness as a philosophy 
of immanence. Spinoza, we are told, conceives “the best” or “the purest” 
“plane of immanence.”82 If we are to understand what Deleuze and 
Guattari mean, we have to begin with this lengthy detour, and figure 
out what “the plane of immanence” is on their view — and why, for that 
matter, Spinoza’s grappling with it in his illustrious fashion is important 
to the nature of philosophy in general.
The first aspect of this meta-philosophy we must grapple with is 
why “the plane of immanence is not a concept, nor is it the concept of all 
80 If we look up the term “immanence” in that index, we find the following: “Cf. Attribute, Cause, 
Eminence, Nature.” Not especially helpful… But if we then look up Cause, we are confronted with a 
summary on immanent causation similar to the one provided by SPE. (Discussed above). See esp. 
ibid., 79.
81 Deleuze and Guattari (2005 [1991]). Translations my own.
82 Ibid., 62.




















concepts.” 83 If it is not a “concept”, what is it? What kind of speculative 
function does it have, according to Deleuze and Guattari? One inviting 
approach here, therefore, is to begin by contrasting their theory of the 
concept with their theory of the plane of immanence, both of which form 
essential components of their overall meta-philosophical theory.
“Philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, fabricating concepts.”84 
This is the first hard response we get from Deleuze and Guattari to the 
question: What is philosophy? When interpreting this position, some 
charitability is called for, of course, but this meta-philosophical claim at 
least is prima facie intuitively straightforward: Hegel creates a (Hegelian) 
concept of contradiction (contradiction which is surpassed); Nietzsche 
creates a (Nieztschean) concept of difference (difference which is 
affirmed).
The plane of immanence, in contrast with the definition of 
philosophy, defies common-sense. It is, we are told, the “image of 
thought”: it is the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, 
and hence what thought claims for itself by right as thinkable in the first 
place.85 If concepts are fragmentary, “and born from a dice-throw,” they 
“resonate” on a plane.86 If concepts are “events” of thought, the plane 
of immanence is the horizon of all events that are conceptualized, their 
“reservoir”.87 
83 Ibid., 39. See also 43, inter alia: “It is essential not to confuse the plane of immanence with the 




87 Ibid., 39. An entire chapter of QQPH? gives a reply to the question: what are concepts? Among 
much else, we learn that they are not discursive in nature (and, consequently, philosophy itself is not 
a “discursive formation”). “It is the confusion of concepts and propositions that makes us believe in 
the existence of scientific propositions, and that considers the proposition as a veritable “intension” 
(that which the sentence expresses) […] whereas the philosophical concept most often appears as a 
senseless proposition (une proposition dénuée de sens). This confusion reigns in logic and explains 
the infantile conception it makes of philosophy. […] The concept is not at all a proposition, it is not 
propositional, and the proposition is never an intension” (ibid., 28). Meanwhile, the intentional charac-
ter of concepts comes up in connection with their relation to the rules of logic — unsurprisingly, since 
the rules of right reasoning are said to ensure truthful access to reality via concepts. This responds a 
natural epistemological concern: What use do we make of concepts when we make valid judgements? 
Yet what Deleuze and Guattari understand by concept is somewhat orthogonal to the epistemologi-
cal concern: “It is true that the concept is fluid, vague, but not because it is without a contour: it is 
because it is vagabond, non-discursive, in movement on a plane of immanence… [The concept] is not 
at all a reference to lived experience (le vécu) or the states of things, but a consistency defined by 
its internal components; neither denotation of the state of things nor signification of lived experi-
ence, the concept is the event as pure meaning […]. The concept is a form or a force, never a possible 
function in any way. In brief, there is only a philosophical concept on the plane of immanence, and 
scientific functions or logical propositions are not concepts” (ibid., 144-145). Note that Deleuze and 
Guattari are implicitly denying the broadly post-Fregean consensus of seeing concepts as subject 
only to the laws of logic.




















The intimacy of the “concept” and the “plane of immanence” 
should not lead us to think philosophers deduce their concepts from 
their plane of immanence; the relationship between concepts and the 
plane of immanence is one-of-a-kind. This is true despite the fact that 
the same “elements” can be present on the plane and in the concept, 
even though they will not have the same “traits”.88 It is essential in fact 
that the relationship between the plane and the concepts that people it 
not be misconstrued as a deductive one. Philosophy “creates” concepts 
and does not “deduce” them from prior conceptual commitments.89 And 
the plane of immanence is just not the right kind of thing to allow for the 
deduction of concepts. It is the image of thought that thought draws out 
or traces of itself on its own. Last but not least, although the plane is that 
which inaugurates a philosophy, it is not itself a philosophical position, 
but, as we shall see, an instance of what Deleuze and Guattari want to 
think of as the non-philosophical as such. 
Deleuze and Guattari can however affirm that their theory of the 
plane of immanence confirms the “grandiose” Leibnizian and Bergsonian 
view on philosophy as “depending on an intuition that concepts do not 
cease to develop through slight intensive differences”. This Leibnizo-
Bergsonian meta-philosophical view is allegedly supported by the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian suggestion that the “intuition” here be thought of 
as “the enfolding (l’enveloppement) of infinite movements of thought that 
ceaselessly pass over a plane of immanence.”90 True thought is always, 
for Deleuze and Guattari, claiming for itself “infinite movements” or 
“movements of infinity” — movements which compose the plane of 
immanence, like the waves of an ocean. Fundamentally it would appear 
the plane of immanence testifies to how philosophy, “the art” of concept 
creation, is always supplemented and underpinned by some necessary 
non-conceptual inaugural or founding gesture: thought claiming infinite 
movements for itself, 91 staking out an “Un-Tout illimité”.92
Philosophy is the art of the creation of concepts. Perhaps the only 
analogous faculty in us to our philosophical faculty is the artistic faculty, 
the creative drive or skill whereby we imbue meaning into things. What 
is more, a philosophy will pose the problems raised by the concepts that 
people the plane of immanence it has traced or claimed. “Philosophy is 
88 Ibid., 44.
89 Furthermore, genuine philosophers necessarily conceive for their philosophies “conceptual 
persona” (Plato has Socrates, Nietzsche has Zarathustra…) who bring the philosophy to life, the 
correspondence between planes and concepts is not a matter of a mere logical implication or even 
























a constructivism,” 93 and “one must make planes and pose problems, just 
as one creates concepts.”94 This helps explain why philosophers are said 
to “abhor discussion”95 — a vulgar activity if there ever were one. Deleuze 
and Guattari form a multitude of creative voices, not a panel of critics. 
Each philosopher (or, to be precise, philosophy) has to draw up their own 
plane and the concepts which “people” it. What sense is there in having 
an opinion of some other concept, if one has not created it for oneself? 
And if one imports it onto a different plane, as one inevitably does, it 
withers and dies on this foreign soil. “One is never on the same plane.”96 
The art of philosophy is profoundly solitary, motivated by an aristocratic 
ethos of lone heroism, if not precariously solipsistic — or schizophrenic. 
Greedy gregariousness destroys concepts, and “all thought is a fiat, 
and emits a dice throw.”97 Because philosophy is a constructivism, we 
cannot know whether philosophical activities will pose the right problems 
and provide the right solutions until we undertake them for ourselves: 
we must create our own concepts and build our plane of immanence. 
Mere critics chew on old bones; nothing is more pitiful than a historian 
who refuses herself or himself their philosophical prerogatives.98 
But when did the creative process begin, we may reasonably ask? 
Certainly, philosophers work with hand-me-downs; Hegel inherits if 
not his dialectical concept of contradiction the term ‘contradiction’ 
(Widerspruck). There is something in circulation provided by ordinary, 
natural language. The philosopher’s act of creation cannot match a divine 
being’s ex nihilo act of creation, unless these shadow concepts are, like 
the tohu wa-bohu of Genesis, primeval with the act of creation itself. 






98 Ibid., 85. The meta-philosophical commentary on philosophical constructivism and the impos-
sibility of philosophical discussion properly speaking echoes Gueroult (1979). For Gueroult, too, any 
philosophical “doctrine” or “system” essentially posits its own philosophical reality. Gueroult’s 
philosophy of the history of philosophy is neo-Kantian in nature, but with a twist. As Gueroult sees 
it, the transcendental conditions of philosophy — that to qualify as a philosophy a thought must be 
systematized, because all though fundamentally strives to posit an explanatory framework for all re-
ality — disbar many otherwise “philosophical” practices from consideration by the historian. In this 
respect, too, Deleuze resembles Gueroult. For recent discussion of Gueroult’s “dianometics” (“theory 
of doctrines”), see Lærke (2019) and (2020). 
Unlike Gueroult, however, Deleuze seemingly ascribes to the view espoused by his mentor Alquié 
(2005 [1956]), for whom to “understand” a philosophy (read: a historical doctrine) means to empathize 
with it, which one does by performing or following the guiding “intellectual intuition” for oneself. 
In this way, Deleuze, we may say, makes a common ground of Gueroult and Alquié, despite their 
famously acrimonious opposition. See further Deleuze (1969b), on Gueroult’s “genetico-systematic” 
method, and Peden (2014), on the Alquié-Gueroult debate.




















philosophy began, even though the question is particularly pressing in 
the case of historical work. I suppose we may however find attractive the 
more watered-down suggestion that philosophers find themselves always 
already immersed into a world imbued with meaningful concepts, some of 
which they take up and retool in their own acts of creation. 
This extreme Deleuzo-Guattarian ecumenicism will have to be 
moderated, however, in light of a further characterization of the plane 
of immanence that bears directly on the exceptional place of Spinoza in 
their late meta-philosophical theory. 
Insofar as the plane of immanence is not a concept, it is not the 
creation of philosophy, since philosophy consists in the creation of 
concepts. It is thus “pre-supposed,” argue Deleuze and Guattari, not 
in the way that a concept relies on another concept, but in the way 
that concepts themselves rely on a “non-conceptual” or “intuitive” 
comprehension.99 The plane of immanence stands in a paradoxical 
relationship to philosophy: it is “pre-philosophical” yet it also constitutes 
“the internal conditions” of philosophy.100 “Non-philosophy,” Deleuze 
and Guattari write, “is perhaps more at the heart of philosophy that 
philosophy itself, and signifies that philosophy does not content itself 
with being understood only in a philosophical or conceptual manner, but 
addresses itself in its essence to non-philosophers as well.”101 
Deleuze and Guattari are not the first to draw sustained attention 
to non-philosophy, nor even the first to maintain that understanding 
non-philosophy as dwelling at the heart of philosophy can clarify the 
nature of philosophy itself.102 We must recognize the priority of the 
non-philosophical. Moreover, because the plane of immanence is 
“pre-philosophical”, “non-philosophical,” or involves non-conceptual 
“intuition,” write Deleuze and Guattari, forming the plane of immanence 
“implies a sort of hesitant experimentation” on the part of thought; 
it relies on means which are difficult to avow: dreams, pathological 
processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess.103 Indeed, it is 
on the plane of immanence, or rather, it is in continually drawing up the 
plane of immanence as an infinite movement of thought, that philosophy 
toys with chaos, that is non-philosophy. 
99 Deleuze and Guattari (2005), 44.
100 Ibid., 45.
101 Ibid., 45.
102 This project of situating non-philosophy at the foundation of philosophy resonates with post-
Kantian German thinking about the Kantian ding an sich. Thus, in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, for 
instance, the Kantian ding an sich, which for Kant remains non-philosophical or beyond the grasp of 
concepts, becomes becomes the Fichtean I, that is, the non-philosophical ding an sich is reconceived 
as practical reason’s demand to subordinate the Not-I under the unity of the I. For more on this trajec-
tory, see Delbos (1992 [1909]).
103 Ibid., 45.




















In the pre-conceptual gesture of instauration, the philosopher 
grapples with the extremely difficult task of selecting a cut of chaos on 
which their philosophy — their art of concept creation — can be undertaken. 
“The problem of philosophy is to acquire consistency without losing the 
infinity into which thought plunges.”104 As a matter of fact, it is only insofar 
as philosophy is constituted by a selection of chaos that philosophy always 
takes place on planes of immanence — whereas transcendence remains 
derivative, a deleterious side-effect of the way thought claims for itself 
infinite movement as a plane of immanence. The “claiming” or seizing of 
infinite movements of thought, which is built into the very foundation of 
philosophy as its internal and non-philosophical condition, is a claiming 
of “une coupe de chaos.”105 This is what makes thought “dangerous,” 
disruptive, and hostile to transcendence: “la part d’immanence” is really“la 
part du feu.” 106 And it is what Spinoza knew to embrace, at the cost of 
shattering the wall between philosophy and non-philosophy.
For Deleuze and Guattari, understanding chaos is a fraught 
affair. This is due to the nature of chaos: “chaos chaotizes,”107 that is 
to say, unravels and undermines the consistency that thought gives to 
concepts, pushing thought to an unstable infinite variability. And yet, it is 
unavoidable, as it is involved in the very movement of infinity that thought 
gives as its own image when laying claim to its plane of immanence. 
Hence, we are all, think Deleuze and Guattari, plagued by the problem of 
the chaos of thought. “Nothing is more painful, more anguishing than a 
thought that escapes itself, fleeting ideas, ideas that disappear having 
been hardly sketched out, already worn away by oblivion, precipitated into 
others we do not master any better.”108 
Transcendence takes form when chaos overwhelms, as it almost 
inevitably must — almost inevitably, since Spinoza will show us that 
this is not always the case, and transcendence can be repudiated once 
and for all. Thus, chaos is metaphysically prior to transcendence, just 
as non-philosophy is prior to the conceptual art. Transcendence is the 
appearance opinion forms of a guard against chaos — an “umbrella,”109 
something static, a cliché, a thought that is made immobile. On the one 
hand, philosophy is at always war with opinion, and it wages that war by 



























reintroduction of transcendence onto a plane of immanence is “fatal”110— 
inevitable, but also deadly, as it stills and “stops” the movement of infinity 
that thought has claimed for itself as a right.111 One thus has “the choice 
between transcendence and chaos.”112 All philosophers qua thinkers of 
planes of immanence call on chaos, which they both select from and ward 
off in drawing up their image of thought; and all philosophies are united, 
and can be stacked up against one another, in this delicate effort to ward 
off while selectively introducing doses of chaos.
“The plane of immanence is like a cut (coupe) of chaos, and acts 
a sieve (crible).”113 Here is where Spinoza’s immanentism finally comes 
into its full glory. If all philosophies have their own plane of immanence 
that they people with their own concepts, what sense is there in asking 
if one can be better than another? The answer takes up the Deleuzian 
presentation of Spinozism as the philosophy that shows the way out 
of philosophy. The best plane of immanence will be the purest plane of 
immanence, that is, it will have a special “sieve”, one where the infinite 
movement of thought is never stilled, where the floodgates of chaos remain 
unclosed. Spinoza therefore provides the solution to the riddle: the “best” 
plane of immanence is his — because his philosophy surrenders itself to 
the effort to call on chaos in the war against transcendence. That is to say, 
his system fully opens onto the non-philosophical or pre-philosophical 
condition of all philosophy as constituted by a “slice” or “cut” of chaos. 
Spinoza’s philosophy thus tells us about the absolute horizons of all 
philosophy:
“He who knew fully that immanence was only immanent to itself, 
and thus that it was a plane run over with movements of the infinite, 
filled with intensive ordinates, is Spinoza. Thus, he is the prince of 
philosophers. Maybe he is the only one to have made no compromise 
with transcendence, to have hunted it down everywhere. With the 
third kind of knowledge in the last book of the Ethics, he makes the 
movement of the infinite and gives to philosophy infinite speeds. 
He reached unheard of speeds, shortcuts so astonishing that one 
can only speak of music, tornados, wind, and cords. He found the 
only freedom in immanence. He completed (achevé) philosophy, 
because he fulfilled its pre-philosophical supposition. […] Spinoza 

























in vain to escape. Will we ever be mature enough for a Spinozist 
inspiration?”114
In the concluding paragraph to the same chapter, we find sketched out in 
a somewhat fragmented or aphoristic form a second, similar celebration 
of Spinoza’s uniqueness — that is, his uncompromising commitment to 
bear witness to “the plane of immanence” at the core of all philosophy. 
Here the Christological undertones become explicit. Spinoza’s 
“completion” of philosophy is the accomplishment of its primordial 
task as well as the overthrowing of the stricture to which it is normally 
bound, viz. to select a “cut” or “slice” of chaos and not all of chaos, not all 
movements of the infinite:
“Perhaps it is the supreme gesture of philosophy: not so much 
to think THE plane of immanence, but to show that it is there, 
unthought in each plane. To think about it in this manner, as the 
outside and the inside of thought, the outside that is not exterior 
and the inside that is not interior. That which cannot be thought, and 
yet must be thought, this was thought once, just as the Christ was 
incarnated one time to show the possibility of the impossible. Thus, 
Spinoza is the Christ of philosophers, and the greatest philosophers 
are hardly but apostles, who distance themselves or approach 
themselves to this mystery. Spinoza, the infinite becoming-
philosopher (le devenir-philosophe infini). He showed, laid out, 
thought the “best” plane of immanence, that is the purest one, the 
one which neither gives itself over to transcendence nor restores 
any transcendence, the one which inspires the fewest illusions, the 
fewest bad feelings and erroneous perceptions…”115
As I interpret their view here, Deleuze and Guattari are ascribing to 
Spinoza the following: that his philosophy circumscribes the outer limits 
of what any philosophy does when it fully turns itself over to the plane 
of immanence, the plan that all philosophies draw on in a kind of pre-
conceptual gesture of inauguration. That gesture of inauguration, we 
have seen, yields “infinite movements of thought” — the moving, swirling, 
vertiginous ground which philosophy peoples with concepts, the reservoir 
from which philosophy draws its understanding of that which can by 
philosophical right be subsumed under a concept in the first place. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, perhaps we may say that the ultimate 
lesson of Spinoza’s immanentism is to show us that if we take 
philosophy’s claim to dispose of the infinite movement of thought 
114 Ibid., 51-52.
115 Ibid., 61-62.




















seriously, then philosophy has to accept a certain self-identification 
with chaos; philosophy, in including all infinite movement of thought in 
itself, no longer distinguishes itself from non-philosophy. The core meta-
philosophical insight to be gleaned from Spinoza is that for philosophy to 
create maximal concepts, and to have a maximal rational scope, philosophy 
ceases to select against the chaotic character of the movement of 
the infinite in thought. Returning to philosophy’s non-philosophical 
precondition becomes, in the case of Spinoza, philosophy’s purpose. This 
is the price to pay for the abolition of transcendence — a willingness 
to discard the “sieve” or “screen” (crible) that would otherwise select 
against an excess of infinite movement or chaos.
Presumably this sounds decidedly exotic and “Continental” to 
more standard Anglo-centric conceptions both of Spinoza and of the 
interpreter’s job. Nonetheless, it resonates strongly with recent critical 
work in analytic metaphysics by Michael Della Rocca, for whom the 
explanatory demand employed at the heart of all philosophy actually 
instructs us in the ultimate metaphysical insignificance of all rational 
explanations.116 The Christological character of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
characterization of Spinoza should not be too off-putting, either. We can, 
if we are more comfortable with the idea, see them as proffering a kind of 
neo-Wittgensteinian take on the need for philosophy, once complete, to 
discard the philosophical ladder it employed to reach completion.117 
There is no denying of course that immanence in Spinoza has 
taken on bold and strange hues in the late work of Deleuze. QQPH? 
implies a story of a Spinoza who, having become a philosopher because 
he found no deep and lasting joy in mercantile dealings, would have 
seen fit to use philosophy as a way to move beyond mere philosophy. In 
other words, Spinoza’s “immanentism” comes to stand for Spinoza’s 
dream of redemption via philosophy. Here is the rub. Spinoza’s unhinged 
immanentism must appear as sheer chaos, an avenue for non-philosophy 
to claim philosophical rights. Its liberating force is at stake.
116 See the recent work Della Rocca (2020) for the fullest presentation of this view.
117 A view famously espoused in Wittgenstein (1922 [1921]), 6.5
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